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Abstract 
This paper demonstrates the integration of institutional perspectives on energy system 
transitions into formal energy economic modelling. The perspectives of key UK energy 
system stakeholders have been used to develop three socio-technical narratives of 
energy system change that are quantified in a 24-region techno-economic model of the 
country. Implementing these three narratives in the model environment allows their 
feasibility for meeting climate targets to be assessed as well as articulating their implied 
sub-national regional outlooks for technologies and investment. The latter elements are 
discussed in light of the regional socioeconomic and demographic landscape. The study 
highlights some of the regional political dimensions associated with future investment 
targeting in the UK energy system. In particular, energy policy decisions may create 
tensions between the four different UK government administrations as well as raising 
important questions about regional economic development and how an equitable 
energy transition can be achieved for all. 
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 Prominent UK transition scenarios adapted into a whole energy system model 
 Integration process bridges between socio-technical theory and energy 
economic modelling 
 Model spatial detail used to relate geographical impacts to real-world 
regional actors  
 Tensions exposed between sub-regional optimality and national optimality 
 Discussion framed around the complex regional political geography of the UK 
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1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Challenges for modelling the energy transition 
The use of energy economic models by governments and research institutes has come to 
be deeply embedded in the policy process in many countries [1]. Energy models, in the 
broadest sense, are employed at multiple scales. Global models are used for exploring 
the boundaries of human activity within biospherical limits and are central to climate 
policy assessment under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
[2]. At the level of individual countries, models are used for understanding the potential 
impacts of state interventions on the economy and on the environment [3,4]. Models are 
also often applied at the sub-national scale for developing strategic energy options at a 
regional, urban, or district level [5,6].  
Models are valuable tools for thinking about the future when paired with strategic 
scenario planning activities [7]. Historically the principal uses for energy models included 
exploring future challenges to resource security and energy affordability, while today, 
the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions adds a third policy imperative [8]. 
Understanding social, economic and political pathways that can transition different 
countries towards energy systems that are compatible with a climate stabilised future is 
a major undertaking for both scientific research and policy design.  
The use of energy models faces continual challenges from within and outside the 
research community. Common concerns include the transparency of the model structure 
and data [9], the reproducibility of results [10], and whether insights from a cost 
optimisation approach approximate the dynamics of real-world energy transitions [11]. 
National scale models are also sometimes critiqued for their aggregate treatment of 
spatial dynamics that might drive infrastructure development costs [12]. The implied 
assumption of neoclassical economic rationalism regarding technology selection is also 
often criticised [13], as is the use of a single representative agent to capture the 
interaction of multiple real-world actors [14]. Concerns are sometimes raised that the 
apparent power of models to demonstrate solutions to complex problems leads to false 
confidence and the magnitude of the transition challenge being underestimated by 
decision makers [15,16].  
The modelling community has continued to respond to these issues over time through 
important initiatives. Efforts to improve transparency include the development of open 
source tools and datasets like OSeMOSYS [17] and the founding of groups such as 
OpenMod (http://www.openmod-initiative.org/). Concerns that models are “black 
boxes” whose internal workings are poorly understood have prompted development of 
models that facilitate exploration of parameter uncertainty [18–20], and increased the 
prevalence of multi-model exercises to expose uncertainties arising from model 
structure [21,22]. Other notable responses to criticism of model limitations include the 
development multi-regional models to explore spatial dynamics [23,24], models that 
reflect the limited foresight of real decision makers [25], and models that incorporate 
detailed behavioural choice parameters [26–28].  
In this paper we concentrate on increasing the policy relevance of energy systems 
modelling in two key ways. First, we answer some critics of energy systems approaches 
by demonstrating how the perspectives of societal actors and institutions can be 
reflected in modelling. This is achieved by adapting three widely used and popular 
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narrative visions of energy system change, developed in consultation with government, 
business and civil society stakeholders, into a formal modelling environment. Secondly, 
we demonstrate how using a spatially explicit model with sub-national detail enhances 
the value of these existing scenarios by enabling the regional implications of energy 
transitions to be mapped on to the political geography of the real-world system. 
 
1.2 Capturing social and institutional factors in energy modelling 
The history of energy transitions shows that while innovation and markets are important 
factors affecting technological diffusion; governance, political power, and cultural values 
are also major drivers [29,30]. It is common for energy economic models to operate using 
abstract representations of decision-making, typically using a single agent to allocate 
capital on a rational, cost minimisation basis. This serves as a proxy for real-world 
processes where multiple stakeholders interact, often with conflicting priorities and 
objectives. Developing approaches that better reflect the influence of actors and 
institutions in technology pathway assessment is viewed as a core area for the future 
advancement of energy systems modelling [31,32]. 
The sustainability transitions community has been exploring the multi-level, actor 
dependent, co-evolutionary nature of technological innovation and diffusion for several 
decades [33,34]. Transitions have historically been explored using a number of heuristic 
frameworks such as the well-known multi-level perspective (MLP) [35,36]. However, 
these approaches are often acknowledged as being difficult to operationalise for the 
type of quantitative policy assessment practiced by governments in their search for 
pathways towards low carbon energy systems [37–39].  
It has been suggested that the energy modelling and socio-technical transitions 
communities may be able to mutually reinforce one another through collaboration. 
Socio-technical insights have the potential to bring more realism to the unfolding of 
transitions within models, while in turn, quantitative modelling offers a path for socio-
technical perspectives to be incorporated more directly into the policy decision process 
as well as to have their basic accounting assumptions tested. One suggested approach 
for such interdisciplinary research is the recent push towards developing formal models 
of socio-technical transitions in energy [40–42]. Another valid approach is to use existing 
tools and scenarios and bridge between the different analytical disciplines [43]. This 
paper takes the latter approach, and explores the integration of energy system 
modelling with long term scenarios for socio-technical change developed by the UK’s 
longest running energy transitions research community, the Realising Transition 
Pathways consortium (Section 2.1).  
 
1.3 Exploring spatial implications of energy transitions 
The geographical specifics of future energy decarbonisation pathways are important to 
explore for reasons of political feasibility, societal acceptability, and from the perspective 
of corporate interests. Spatial detail is crucial for understanding the core aspects of 
energy planning, such as regional resource availability, the geographical distribution of 
future demands, and the requirement to build or extend infrastructure networks. 
Spatiality is also key for understanding the effect of energy transitions on different 
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stakeholders, especially regional actors. Multiple reviews of energy scenario studies call 
for work to more explicitly link insights to real-world actors as a means of increasing their 
relevance for policymaking [44,45].  
National scale models frequently constrain their spatial representation to a single region, 
partially due to data availability, but also due to the additional complexity and 
computational burden of representing inter-regional energy flows at the sub-national 
level. Sub-national spatial disaggregation in energy economy models remains 
comparatively rare in the UK, which is the context for our case study (Section 1.4). 
Notable exceptions include a 2-region MARKAL model for Scotland and the rest of the 
UK [46,47], and the Energy Systems Modelling Environment (ESME) model of the UK 
Energy Technologies Institute (ETI) [48], which features in this paper (Section 2.4). Most 
UK energy decarbonisation studies to date have tended to focus on delivering insights 
into future energy transitions at the national aggregate level, with the regional outlook 
for new technologies and infrastructures, and the implications for key stakeholders such 
as sub-national governments and local communities remaining underexplored. 
 
1.4 UK policy context 
While we consider here the case study of the UK, many of the challenges associated with 
long term energy planning in an era of state decentralisation and increased regionalism 
apply across different national contexts with diverse energy, environmental, and 
economic objectives. Political devolution has been called a global trend [49], and 
continues to be a driving force in many countries which were previously characterised by 
highly centralised forms of governance, such as Japan [50], Kenya [51], India, Nepal [52], 
Mexico, and Brazil [53]. Energy transitions themselves are a global issue, with 175 states 
now signatories to the Paris Agreement on GHG emissions reduction [54], and 164 
countries working to achieve national renewable energy targets [55].  
The UK is a unitary nation state with four constituent member countries. Three of these 
countries, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, have semi-autonomous governments 
with varying levels of legislative and revenue raising power, while the central UK 
Government in London also acts as the de facto English government. The devolved 
administrations have significantly increased their autonomy from the central UK 
Government since their creation in 1999. An increased desire for self-determination and 
differences in ideological and popular pressures in Scotland have led to significant policy 
divergence from England [56], a trend which seems only poised to accelerate in future 
[57]. The Scottish independence referendum of 2014 came close to breaking up the UK 
as a political entity, and arguably marked the start of a “newly emerging age of 
disunification” [58].  
At the time of writing, the UK is currently experiencing a period of “constitutional flux” 
where the political relationships between different member countries are being 
renegotiated [57]. As well as sub-national tensions between the devolved 
administrations and the central UK government, tensions also exist between the many 
regions that lie within England, with the future of regional governance at this scale 
unclear [59]. Despite having no explicit political representation except at the UK level, 
English regions remain an important element of English civil and political society, with 
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regional identities being particularly strong in areas such as London, the North East, and 
Cornwall in the South West [60].  
The “untidy” political geography of the country [59] has interesting implications for 
energy policy and any transition towards a shared low carbon future. The UK as a whole 
is committed to achieving an 80% reduction in CO2 emissions based on 1990 levels 
under the 2008 Climate Change Act [61], while the Scottish administration has also 
signed separate Scottish targets into law [62]. There remain many unresolved policy 
questions at the sub-national scale. How will targets set for individual nations contribute 
to a transition at the UK level? Which UK regions should be allocated more centrally 
administered funds for large-scale capital investments in infrastructure, and which 
territories should contribute more tax revenue to energy projects? Which local 
communities should be saddled with potential negative consequences such as habitat 
change, environmental damage, or potentially unpopular technologies such as nuclear 
power stations? Should the energy transition be viewed as a potential vehicle for 
addressing regional disparities in wealth and employment? 
National-scale energy models have played a strong role in the process of setting the level 
of ambition for the UK contribution towards global climate mitigation efforts [63]. 
Multiple model analyses have triangulated the main trends required to bring about the 
UK energy transition along a cost minimised pathway. These include a major shift to low 
carbon electricity generation, the widespread electrification of heat and transport, and a 
reduced role for fossil fuel vehicles and unabated natural gas [64–67].  
While several spatially detailed UK models have been used for exploring energy 
transitions, these have tended to focus on technological sub-systems such as electricity 
[68–73], hydrogen [74–77], and bioenergy [78,79]. These models have lacked a whole 
energy system perspective and have often not fully endogenised the effects of 
transitions in energy infrastructure on other sectors such as building heating and 
transport. Energy system optimisation models (ESOMs) that can determine cost optimal 
pathways for the electricity system in the context of a wider national decarbonisation 
strategy involving all economic sectors, are more suited to this task. Partial attempts to 
incorporate sub-national detail into UK whole energy system analysis have been carried 
out in the past. These relied on linking ESOMs with a GIS-based frameworks [80] or 
multi-regional infrastructure planning models [81]. 
 
1.5 Aims and objectives 
This paper adapts three prominent and widely-used scenarios of socio-technical change 
in the UK energy system into a spatially explicit energy system model. Past analytical 
work has mainly concentrated on the technical feasibility of these scenarios within the 
power sector, leaving cross-sector interactions and questions of wider resource use 
underexplored. The process of integrating these scenarios into a formal spatial model of 
the whole energy system achieves multiple objectives: 
i. It serves a diagnostic purpose by expanding the system boundary considered in 
the scenarios and testing the viability of their narratives at the system level. 
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ii. It enhances the policy relevance of the scenarios by shedding light on their 
potential geographical implications for various sub-national regions and actors. 
 
iii. It advances policy discourse in the UK by highlighting the potential for different 
approaches to the energy transition to produce strong regional disparities. This in 
turn, offers a path to understanding whether an unequal distribution of costs and 
benefits between regions is socially and politically acceptable or not, and whether 
there are opportunities for inter-regional cooperation. 
 
iv. It advances the state of the art in interdisciplinary research by demonstrating 
integration between the analytical disciplines of socio-technical transitions 
theory and energy systems modelling. 
Section 1.0 has already covered the rationale for undertaking this work and described 
the policy context for the case study. Section 2.0 describes the project background 
within which this work was undertaken, gives an overview of the scenarios used, explores 
the key features of the energy model employed, and explains the integration process. 
Section 3.0 presents the spatial results and discusses the interesting features found in 
each transition pathway. Section 4.0 reflects on what the modelling exercise reveals 
about the feasibility of the scenarios, presents a cross-comparison of regional impacts, 
and evaluates the transitions from the perspective of affordability, equity and public 
attitudes, while also touching on the implications for policy and for future research. 
Section 5.0 summarises the main conclusions of the study and makes the case for 
modellers to participate where possible in interdisciplinary research as a means of 
enhancing the policy relevance of modelling, despite the challenges it brings. Finally, the 
Online Supplementary Information included with this paper contains an expanded 
description of the scenario storylines and a sector-by-sector breakdown of model 
calibration inputs. These are not required to understand the paper, but interested 
readers may find them useful. 
 
2.0 Modelling and analysis approach 
2.1 Realising Transition Pathways (RTP) 
The Transition Pathways (TP) project and its successor, Realising Transition Pathways 
(RTP), are interdisciplinary studies of the UK’s transition towards a low-carbon future 
that were carried out principally between 2008-2016 by a consortium of the UK’s leading 
research universities [82,83]. The Realising Transition Pathways narratives have captured 
the attention of key decision makers over the last 8 years and continue to remain 
influential in UK policy circles. RTP remains a key reference point for UK energy policy 
research as one of the only long term decarbonisation pathway studies to explicitly 
address actor and institutional perspectives in its scenario framework and to explore 
them simultaneously from economic, engineering, and behavioural research 
standpoints. The project is notable for its strong emphasis on: 
i. Exploring the co-evolutionary nature of technological, behavioural and 
institutional responses to achieving energy system change. 
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ii. Incorporating stakeholder perspectives on how transitions can be shaped by 
different government, market and social actors into quantitative assessment. 
 
iii. Understanding the process of bridging between research disciplines and critically 
reflecting on the process [84]. 
The RTP approach can be contrasted against many similar studies which have often not 
addressed actor perspectives or achieved stakeholder engagement to the extent seen in 
this project, and typically differentiate between scenarios using dimensions such as 
climate policy ambition (e.g. BAU, low ambition, high ambition pathways), technological 
change (e.g. renewable energy-led, nuclear energy-led), or overall demand (e.g. low, 
medium, high). A serious attempt to consider the social dimension, in particular, has 
historically often been absent from much model-based energy research [85]. 
 
2.2 The RTP scenarios in the policy engagement process 
This paper can be viewed as the latest step in multi-stage process, with each step 
building on previous work. The process is aimed at improving the relevance of the RTP 
pathways for policy. As will be explained in more detail below, the existing pathway 
narratives have been well defined from a power systems perspective, but their cross-
sector implications, their emission pathways, their implied resource requirements and 
their spatial dimensions have been largely unexplored to date. A graphical illustration is 
given below in Figure 1. To summarise: 
(A) Dialogue with stakeholders 
Researchers began the project by entering into consultation with key 
stakeholders in the UK energy system [83]. Government bodies involved included 
the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), the UK energy sector 
regulator (Ofgem), and the Committee on Climate Change (CCC), a statutory 
regulatory body set up to monitor and advise on UK Government progress 
towards national climate targets. Market participants included representatives 
from the so-called “Big Six” UK energy companies [86], and the transmission 
system operator, National Grid. Also consulted were independent third sector 
organisations such as the WWF and the Centre for Alternative Technology (CAT) 
that represent important civil society actors in the UK energy policy field.  
 
(B) Transition pathway narratives 
Out of the dialogue process emerged three principal “visions” [87] or pathways 
for the future socio-technical transition which served as vehicles for integrating 
insights from different research disciplines such as engineering, economics, 
psychology, anthropology and history. This has allowed the pathways to be 
explored not only in terms of their technical dimensions, which is common in 
energy policy assessment studies, but also in terms of the institutional 
governance [88], business models [89] and policy interventions [90] that might 
be needed to realise the transitions.  
 
The three pathway narratives all describe futures with a similar normative goal, 
the decarbonisation of the energy system, but achieve this transition through 
different means. These scenarios have been found to be compelling by UK 
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policymakers due to their focus on not only the technical evolution of the 
electricity supply system but also because they explicitly elaborate on the 
behaviour and motivations of key stakeholders. The pathways each represent a 
stylized worldview of how energy system change might unfold, and are 
characterised as being either market-, government- or civil society-led. 
Researchers engaged in a multi-year process of dialogue with various 
stakeholders which has contributed to iteratively refining the narratives through 
time (X). The pathways, which are the subject of multiple research publications, 
have their key features summarised below in Section 2.3. 
 
(C) Technical elaboration process (electricity system) 
An important part of the process of policy engagement and critical reflection on 
the pathways involves exploring their technical feasibility. This has been 
investigated to date using detailed engineering simulation models of the 
electricity system [91,92], ultimately resulting in some elements of the pathway 
narratives being revised in light of the findings (Y).  
 
(D) Techno-economic assessment (whole energy system)  
This is where the work presented in this paper falls into the overall policy 
engagement process. While the technical feasibility of the scenarios within the 
power sector has been investigated in detail by past publications under (C), there 
remain important unknowns regarding cross-sector interactions, resource use, 
and climate target compliance. Past model-based studies using the pathways 
have not endogenised important considerations such as the costs of any 
transition or the availability of key resources, such as bioenergy. 
 
One assessment found that the Market Rules narrative may fail to hit UK 2050 
CO2 targets and suggested that additional mitigation measures not captured in 
their modelling such as “hydrogen production with CCS for use in transport” 
might be needed [92]. A cross-examination of the Central Co-ordination narrative 
with multiple models has also found "inconsistencies” in the narrative and 
concluded that the storyline had a “fragile nature”, ultimately proposing that the 
scenarios should continue to be iteratively developed further in future to close 
the credibility gap [22]. Implementation in a whole energy system model was 
recommended as the logical next step [93]. This paper describes such a process. 
In turn, the insights arising from this paper will be used to iterate the narrative 
development process in future (Z). 
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Figure 1 – Enhancing policy engagement process using Realising Transition Pathways 
research  
 
2.3 Pathway summary 
A brief summary of the narrative elements of the Realising Transition Pathways 
scenarios is described below in Table 1. An expanded description of the storylines and 
the envisaged roles for government, businesses and consumers can be found in the 
Online Supplementary Information. In the first pathway, Market Rules, private companies 
drive the transition under a legislative framework that incentivises investment in low 
carbon generation through the introduction of a high carbon price. Energy efficiency 
measures meet with only limited success at the same time as widespread electrification 
of heating, transport and industrial demand occurs, leading to large increases in overall 
electricity consumption. In the second pathway, Central Co-ordination, the government 
takes an interventionist role in bringing about system change through issuing direct 
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contracts for generation capacity. Electrification of end-use sectors is widespread, but 
moderate success in energy efficiency limits overall increases in demand. The third 
narrative, Thousand Flowers, describes a low carbon transition where civil society acts as 
a principal agent of change, and is characterised by significant deployment of 
community energy schemes and the widespread penetration of distributed micro-
generation. This is in direct contrast to Market Rules and Central Co-ordination, which 
are dominated by the deployment of large-scale centralised low-carbon generators. 
Energy efficiency measures and behavioural change, combined with less electrification 
of building heating, strongly limits increases in electricity demand relative to the other 
scenarios. 
Table 1 – Summary of core transition narratives 
Transition 
Narrative 
Principal Agent 
of Change 
Key Narrative Elements Demand Supply 
Market Rules 
Corporate 
utilities: The “Big 
Six” UK energy 
companies and 
their successors 
Government puts in place an electricity 
market framework with high carbon 
prices and supports early and successful 
deployment of Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS) technology as well as 
offshore wind.  
 
Existing market players retrench 
decarbonisation efforts around large 
scale technologies, with distributed 
generation failing to emerge.  
Large scale 
electrification of heat, 
transport, and 
industrial processes. 
 
Limited success of 
energy efficiency 
programmes leads to 
large increase in 
electricity demand by 
2050 (+50%).  
Key electricity 
technologies: Fossil 
Thermal CCS 
Nuclear,  
Offshore Wind, 
 
Central  
Co-ordination 
The nation state: 
a Strategic 
Energy Agency 
set up by the 
government to 
direct the energy 
transition 
Government establishes a Strategic 
Energy Agency that issues central 
contracts for procurement of generation 
plant to bidders.  
 
To minimise disruption to the 
established institutional framework, 
government concentrates on delivery of 
large-scale low carbon generation, 
especially nuclear power, and 
technologies where the UK may be able 
to develop a viable export market, such 
as offshore wind  
Large scale 
electrification of heat, 
transport, and 
industrial processes.  
 
Increases in electricity 
demand in the period 
to 2050 are limited 
(+20%) through 
successful energy 
efficiency 
programmes. 
Key electricity 
technologies: 
Nuclear,  
Onshore Wind,  
Fossil Thermal CCS 
Offshore Wind 
Marine Power 
Thousand 
Flowers 
Civil society: a 
bottom-up 
transition led by 
community 
energy groups 
Widespread growth in community-scale 
energy deployment and consumer 
involvement in energy supply, 
facilitated by a sympathetic regulatory 
and governance regime. 
 
Large-scale deployment of distributed 
micro-generation occurs and electricity 
from community energy schemes 
expands to meet 50% of supply. 
 
Large-scale utilities diversify their 
business models to enter the Energy 
Service Company (ESCO) market or 
accept the loss of market share and 
concentrate on providing grid balancing 
services. 
Large scale 
electrification of 
transport and 
industrial processes, 
but much less heat is 
electrified owing to 
the popularity of 
bioenergy CHP. 
 
Energy efficiency 
programmes 
combined with 
behavioural change 
over time limits the 
increase in electricity 
demand to 10% by 
2050. 
Key electricity 
technologies: 
Bioenergy fuelled 
combined heat and 
power (CHP), 
Solar PV, 
Onshore Wind, 
Fossil Thermal CCS 
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2.4 The ESME model 
Energy system optimisation models (ESOMs) that explore technology portfolio choice 
using linear programing techniques are particularly well suited to exploring complex 
trade-offs between resource availability, cost, and environmental impacts. The Energy 
Systems Modelling Environment (ESME) is a bottom-up techno-economic model 
developed by the UK Energy Technologies Institute (ETI) [48]. Like other ESOMs (e.g. 
MARKAL [94], TIMES [26], MESSAGE [95], OSeMOSYS [17]) the model employs an 
inter-temporal cost minimisation algorithm to balance energy supply and demand across 
all sectors of the economy through the deployment of new technologies under 
operational and resource constraints. ESME has been used for decarbonisation pathway 
analysis by not only the ETI and their member organisations, but also by the Committee 
on Climate Change [96], UK academia [97,98], and the government’s own Department 
of Energy and Climate Change [99]. ESME can be distinguished from a similar models by 
its spatial disaggregation into 24 regions (12 on land, 9 offshore, and 3 offshore carbon 
sequestration locations), which will be the focus of the analysis presented here.  
ESME covers the buildings, transport, and industry sectors as end-use demands. From a 
supply perspective, ESME covers downstream energy production from primary resources 
i.e. they appear in the model as fuel products or feedstocks that have already been 
extracted and refined into usable forms rather than as pure raw materials. ESME is a 
technologically rich model, with detailed representations of existing and future options 
for energy conversion, storage, transmission and distribution infrastructure, buildings, 
industry and transport. As well as covering the electricity system, ESME is detailed in its 
representation of heat networks, hydrogen, carbon capture, and bioenergy conversion 
chains. The model is also not limited to building new capital stock in pursuit of its 
objectives but also has options to retrofit existing assets like buildings and power 
stations, and to reinforce existing networks. ESME aims to represent the total costs of 
energy system transformation, which are projected forward in 5-year intervals from a 
2010 baseline. The ESME objective function is constrained to meet carbon and resource 
limits defined at each time step, and is also required to balance energy demand and 
supply in all diurnal and seasonal time periods.  
While not possessing the same level of engineering detail in each sector as other models 
used on the Realising Transition Pathways project to date, the ESME model benefits 
from breadth, providing a simultaneous assessment of technical feasibility, economic 
costs, and environmental target compliance across all end-use sectors as well as a 
detailed description of energy supply vectors that have not been explored to date in 
depth, such as those for district heating, bioenergy and hydrogen. 
 
2.5 Adapting pathways into ESME 
Typical practice for using ESOMs involves defining a model database with cost and 
performance information on different technologies, and a reference energy system that 
describes process interactions, e.g. what types of resource can be converted along which 
paths to meet end-user demands. The models are then often given many degrees of 
freedom regarding technology selection to meet environmental and resource use targets 
and used to generate solutions that minimise economic costs.  
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Representing the cost optimal pathway for transitions is a useful exercise, but this 
represents only one set of possible outcomes for the energy system. Real-world 
processes where multiple actors negotiate, reach compromises or compete strategically 
are abstracted into a single rational planning agent. Results achieved under such a 
modelling paradigm effectively assume that real-world actors are tightly coordinated, 
and that investment decisions are made on the basis of maximising net social welfare. 
This is of course, one set of valid set assumptions to make, but equally plausible 
outcomes are found in work exploring so-called “second best” [100] futures that take 
into account political and social barriers that might make achieving the mathematically 
optimal outcome impossible [27,101,102]. This is the category into which this study falls. 
We seek to reflect societal and institutional factors in our work and in particular, the 
perspectives of our energy system stakeholders (see Section 2.2). 
In this paper, we demonstrate an approach for integrating existing scenario narratives 
into energy system modelling by heavily constraining technology selection in some parts 
of the model while offering various degrees of freedom to other elements (Section 2.6). 
The constraining of power sector generation along specific pathways, in particular, is 
carried out intentionally to reflect the views of UK policymakers on technology 
deployment levels that may arise under our existing socio-technical scenarios (Section 
2.3).  
Reflecting these power sector scenarios in a formal whole system model enables their 
feasibility for meeting UK climate targets (which are assessed at the system level) to be 
tested explicitly, and also directly enhances the policy relevance of energy system 
models in the UK more generally by demonstrating their ability to build-on and expand 
the horizons of existing widely recognised research efforts. The integration process can 
be thought of as one example of a “bridging” exercise between the analytical disciplines 
of socio-technical transitions theory and energy system modelling [43]. The process of 
expanding the storyline narratives into a formal model environment to allow further 
interrogation and testing can be characterised as one of using the model as a “prosthesis 
for the imagination” in the tradition of long term policy analysis [103]. 
Therefore, rather than exploring a least cost pathway that ignores stakeholder views on 
changing socio-technical preferences, institutional developments, and non-cost barriers 
to technology deployment, the purpose of using a model in this paper is to: 
i. Explicitly reflect the stakeholder perspectives on future developments in the UK 
energy system that have emerged from a multi-year dialogue and engagement 
process, allowing the insights from this paper to align with and complement 
other research on business models, policy design and institutional governance 
that has emerged from the Realising Transition Pathways project (Section 2.2) 
 
ii. Use the rich system characterisation, technological detail and cost optimisation 
framework of the ESME model to elaborate on loosely defined or undefined 
narrative elements, especially the spatial deployment of technologies (which 
impacts various real-world actors), and explore cross-sector interactions between 
the power sector (as imagined in the original storylines) and other parts of the 
energy system (more detail is given below in Section 2.6). 
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iii. Explore the viability, or indeed the fragility (see discussion on past inconsistencies 
in Section 2.2) of the existing scenario narratives when the system boundary is 
expanded from the power sector to include the wider energy system (some 
insights in this regard are discussed in Section 4.1). 
 
2.6 Modelling process 
The key elements of the Market Rules, Central Co-ordination, and Thousand Flowers 
pathways were implemented in ESME v3.4, following a “Storyline and Simulation” 
approach [104]. In the interest of brevity, a sector-by-sector breakdown of key model 
inputs under each scenario are provided in the Online Supplementary Information for this 
paper. All scenarios were constrained to meet long term GHG reduction targets  along a 
linear decarbonisation trajectory from 2010 to 2050 which approximates the process of 
setting 5-year carbon budgets that is enshrined in UK climate policy legislation [61]. 
Changes to fuel prices through time were aligned with central government projections 
from DECC [105]. 
Figure 2 provides a graphical summary of the principles applied in adapting the narrative 
storylines into the model environment: 
1. The Tightly Defined Narrative Elements, such as the national power sector 
generation portfolios found in each pathway and aggregate changes to electricity 
demand over time are replicated in the model through the use of build rate and 
capacity constraints, effectively matching the parameters used in past work 
under the technical elaboration process (Section 2.2) 
 
2. The pathways feature several Partially Defined Narrative Elements, such as 
aggregate changes in industrial demand, which have their broad characteristics 
described in the storyline but not the specific technological details. These are 
implemented in the model by constraining the overall demand trajectories (e.g. 
industrial demand) to match those in the narratives while using the least cost 
functionality of the ESME model to see which specific technologies might be 
selected to enable these transitions. This allows some of the detail of energy 
transitions outside of the power sector to be explored while maintaining the 
integrity of the scenario narratives themselves. 
 
3. Finally, there are Largely Undefined Narrative Elements in the existing 
storylines. These include technological transitions in non-road transport sectors 
such as aviation, the spatial deployment of technologies, primary resource use, 
and whether the scenarios actually comply with national emissions targets. Here, 
the model data, process structure, and cost optimisation framework for 
investment allocation decisions is used as a means of exploring details in the 
pathways that were never formally quantified by the stakeholder groups involved 
in the narrative development process, and as a means of understanding the 
technical feasibility of the existing storylines. For example, in the case of power 
generation technologies, we rely on the intertemporal cost minimisation 
formulation of the model to regionally disaggregate the overall power sector 
portfolios that are established in the narratives at the national level. We also rely 
on the GHG accounting feature of the model to understand whether the 
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modelled scenarios achieve the climate policy targets or not i.e. whether the 
model solves with the imposed GHG constraints. The spatial trade-off between 
locating energy supply within a given region and importing or exporting from 
other regions is determined on a cost basis as a function of: 
a. Existing transmission capacity 
b. Constraints on siting power plant in a given region 
c. Regional resource availability 
d. Existing generation capacity 
 
Figure 2 – Adaptation of transition pathway narratives to model environment and 
expansion of system boundaries 
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3.0 Results  
The modelling process outlined in Section 2.6 revealed that for all 3 narrative pathways 
the ESME model found it impossible to achieve national emissions reduction targets by 
2050 without pursuing a bioenergy sequestration strategy. The level of bioenergy 
imports was then progressively raised for all three scenarios until the model found 
working solutions. The implications of this finding for the feasibility of the pathway 
narratives are discussed further in Section 4.1. Given the stated focus of this paper on 
spatial issues, we focus the remainder of our results analysis on the geographical 
distribution of power sector investments and the implications for different sub-national 
regions.  
 
3.1 Market Rules 
Market Rules has the highest electricity demand of all three scenarios, given the limited 
progress made in the deployment of energy efficiency measures under the storyline 
(Section 2.3), and also has the highest installed capacity. Market Rules sees large-scale 
deployment of fossil thermal generation with carbon capture and storage (CCS), 
offshore wind energy and marine power (Figure 3). The scenario also involves a limited 
amount of unabated fossil thermal capacity. Nuclear power also expands from 
contemporary levels, although not to the extent envisaged under the alternative Central 
Co-ordination case. Land-based regions on the English East coast receive strong 
investments in fossil thermal CCS plant. The British North Sea, off the East coast of 
England, is an area of high potential for carbon sequestration [106,107], with this 
assumption reflected in the ESME model. The spatial distribution of CCS plant is the 
result of the model seeking to minimise investments in transmission capacity both for 
electricity and captured CO2. The East coast regions of England emerge as attractive 
locations for CCS plant not only because of their proximity to offshore carbon storage 
reservoirs, but also because London, the South East, and the East of England are major 
demand centres. The system also places some CCS plant in the West Midlands region, 
which is also a key demand centre and a strategic central position on the transmission 
network.  
Around 30% of total electricity generation capacity in Market Rules is offshore wind, 
marine, or tidal power. Due to the particular geographical distribution of resource 
potential assumed by the ESME model, this results in Scotland seeing strong 
investments in wind and tidal energy. As a consequence, Market Rules requires around 
30% greater investment in inter-regional electricity transmission compared to Central 
Co-ordination and Thousand Flowers, which is associated with strengthening existing 
infrastructure to supply power to the South of the UK. While investment broadly follows 
demand centres, as might be expected, two of the largest investment regions that stand 
out from this analysis (accounting for onshore and offshore assets) are Scotland and the 
East of England (Figure 4). 
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Figure 3 – Market Rules, geographical distribution of electricity generation capacity by type in 2050 
 
Figure 4 – Market Rules, geographical distribution of cumulative electricity system investments to 
2050 
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3.2 Central Co-ordination 
The Central Co-ordination scenario has changes to electricity demand over time that 
result in overall consumption being lower than Market Rules but higher than Thousand 
Flowers. The storyline features some progress in deployment of energy efficiency 
measures under the narrative (Section 2.3), but also strong electrification of heat and 
transport. Central Co-ordination actually has the lowest installed capacity of all three 
scenarios, owing to its strong reliance on baseload nuclear and fossil CCS plant and the 
assumed intermittency of renewables under Thousand Flowers (Section 3.3).  
Central Co-ordination is characterised by a large expansion of nuclear power in England 
and Wales. The regions which emerge from the modelling with the largest 
concentrations of new nuclear deployment are the South East, the South West, the 
North West and the North East (Figure 5). Fossil CCS and large-scale renewable energy 
are distributed in a similar fashion to Market Rules, although the overall scale of their 
deployment is lower, particularly for marine renewables. This is because under Central 
Co-ordination, more of the future demand for energy, which is dominated by England, is 
met by nuclear power physically located in England, Wales or in offshore regions close to 
England. This lessens the requirement for transmission capacity investments on long 
distance parts of the network, such as improving the connectivity between the South of 
England and Scotland. When compared to Market Rules, the distribution of cumulative 
investment required to 2050 shifts away from Scotland and towards English regions 
(Figure 6). 
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Figure 5 - Central Co-ordination, geographical distribution of electricity generation capacity by type in 
2050 
 
Figure 6 – Central Co-ordination, geographical distribution of cumulative electricity system 
investments to 2050 
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3.3 Thousand Flowers 
The Thousand Flowers storyline features the highest levels of energy efficiency and has a 
significant fraction of future heat demand met by bioenergy CHP rather than through 
electrification (Section 2.3). End-use demand for electricity is therefore the lowest out of 
the three scenarios assessed. However, due to the assumed intermittent operation of 
many of the supply sources, such as solar PV and wind energy, the total installed 
capacity is actually slightly higher than that found in Central Co-ordination (Section 3.2). 
Thousand Flowers involves the significant deployment of micro-generation 
technologies, particularly solar photovoltaics and micro-CHP, as well community-scale 
bioenergy CHP and some large-scale renewable electricity generation technologies 
(Figure 7). In contrast to other narratives, where most fossil thermal generation with CCS 
is found on the East coast, CCS plant in Thousand Flowers is found in nearly all regions. 
As a result, Thousand Flowers implies a more extensive CO2 transmission system than 
either Market Rules or Central Co-ordination.  Analysis of seasonal and diurnal demand 
supply matching in ESME reveals that the CCS generation is mainly being used for 
baseload electricity supply rather than as peaking plant. Scotland and the South East of 
England are the two regions which require the highest levels of investment in this 
scenario (Figure 8). 
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Figure 7 – Thousand Flowers, geographical distribution of electricity generation capacity by type in 
2050 
 
Figure 8 – Thousand Flowers, geographical distribution of cumulative electricity system investments 
to 2050 
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4.0 Discussion 
The process of adapting the Realising Transition Pathways scenarios into a spatially 
explicit whole system energy model for the UK yields a number of insights regarding the 
feasibility of the original narratives for meeting UK climate targets, the total investment 
costs implied under each transition, the distribution of costs spatially and between 
stakeholders, and the physical siting of new technologies. These geographical features 
all have different implications for governments and local communities.  
 
4.1 Pathway feasibility 
As noted at the start of Section 3.0, all scenarios required bioenergy sequestration 
technologies to achieve UK climate targets for 2050. As none of the original Realising 
Transition Pathways scenarios (Section 2.3) include bioenergy sequestration within the 
electricity sector, this technology was employed in the model principally for creating 
alternative decarbonised energy carriers such as hydrogen and biofuels. Sequestration 
levels in all scenarios were under 100 MtCO2/annually by 2050, which can be considered 
small relative to the UK’s estimated offshore sequestration potential of 78 Gt [107]. A 
dependence on negative emissions technologies to achieve very deep emissions 
reduction targets within 30-40 years is a common result in many energy system studies 
[108] and the UK is no exception [97]. One potential alternative to sequestration to 
achieve targets would be for the UK to contribute to global climate mitigation efforts 
through extraterritorial measures such as pursing mitigation options in other countries 
(e.g. afforestation through emission credit purchases) but an assumption of 
decarbonisation through domestic action was employed in this paper in line with the 
government’s own ambitions. 
The model results presented here rely on levels of bioenergy that are at the high end of 
the range considered by the Committee on Climate Change [109,110], around 500 TWh 
(1800 PJ). This implies that the Realising Transition Pathways scenarios can be 
considered as being consistent with UK climate targets if there are significant levels of 
bioenergy imports from overseas, or if land use conversion for energy crop cultivation 
can be achieved in a sustainable fashion beyond the extent explored to date by the CCC. 
The future availability of bioenergy imports to the UK is complex to estimate and beyond 
the scope of this paper, depending on future global trade patterns, the level of climate 
policy ambition found in other countries, and their reliance on bioenergy for domestic 
use. Interested readers should refer to work by Slade et al. on global bioenergy resource 
uncertainties [111] and how this may affect the UK more specifically [112,113].  
 
4.2 Regional investment 
Table 2 compares per capita investment levels, generation capacity additions, and the 
dominant technologies per region found in each scenario against regional socioeconomic 
data. This includes measures of gross household disposable income (GDHI), 
unemployment, and the percentage of the population living outside of major urban 
areas. Regions in Table 2 are arranged by income/capita in descending order so that the 
wealthiest areas are at the top, and the most economically disadvantaged at the bottom. 
The inclusion of a measure of rural population stems from the observation that rural 
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areas pose particular challenges to economic development. They often do not have the 
critical mass of population and transport links to develop economies of scale and attract 
a wide range of industries. Regional infrastructure development projects can therefore 
be viewed as highly desirable as they drive investment flow and can create opportunities 
for employment and wealth creation in the areas where they are located. The use of 
simple metrics such as jobs/MW has been shown to be problematic [114] and is not 
attempted here, but it is clear that investment brings positive benefits. At the same time, 
there can be negative impacts from infrastructure projects, such as visual siting of 
industrial plant and transmission lines that change the aesthetics of historically agrarian 
or woodland areas. 
 
Table 2 – Summary comparison of regional socioeconomic data and key evaluation metrics 
Region1, 
Income/Capita2, Rural 
Unemployment3, 
Rural Population4 
Investment (£/Capita) 
Capacity (GWe) 
Market Rules 
Central  
Co-ordination 
Thousand  
Flowers 
London 
Income/capita: £20,475 
Unemployment: 9.7% 
Rural Population: 0.2% 
Investment, Electricity 247 373 1,011 
Investment, All Energy 1,324 1,240 2,325 
Generation Capacity 5.9 3.3 8.2 
Dominant Technologies Fossil Thermal Fossil Thermal Renewable Energy 
South East 
Income/capita: £18,124 
Unemployment: 6.3% 
Rural Population: 20.4% 
Investment, Electricity 1,406 1,602 2,412 
Investment, All Energy 2,359 2,605 3,175 
Generation Capacity 24.6 25.0 26.0 
Dominant Technologies Fossil Thermal CCS Fossil Thermal CCS Renewable Energy 
East of England 
Income/capita: £16,743 
Unemployment: 6.9% 
Rural Population: 28.9% 
Investment, Electricity 2,717 2,787 2,593 
Investment, All Energy 4,927 4,838 4,185 
Generation Capacity 24.8 18.0 18.2 
Dominant Technologies Fossil Thermal CCS Offshore Renewables Renewable Energy 
South West 
Income/capita: £16,049 
Unemployment: 6.6% 
Rural Population: 31.6% 
Investment, Electricity 2,417 2,261 3,234 
Investment, All Energy 3,924 3,982 5,291 
Generation Capacity 26.7 17.6 22.0 
Dominant Technologies Offshore Renewables Offshore Renewables Renewable Energy 
Scotland 
Income/capita: £15,427 
Unemployment: 8.0% 
Rural Population: 18.4% 
Investment, Electricity 3,590 2,648 3,923 
Investment, All Energy 5,212 3,188 3,839 
Generation Capacity 43.4 30.0 26.4 
Dominant Technologies Offshore Renewables Offshore Renewables Renewable Energy 
East Midlands 
Income/capita: £14,371 
Unemployment: 8.0% 
Rural Population: 26.7% 
Investment, Electricity 566 643 1,886 
Investment, All Energy 1,433 1,388 2,560 
Generation Capacity 6.4 2.8 10.5 
Dominant Technologies Renewable Energy Renewable Energy Renewable Energy 
North West 
Income/capita: £14,220 
Unemployment: 8.5% 
Rural Population: 10.6% 
Investment, Electricity 1,632 1,933 1,350 
Investment, All Energy 3,926 4,014 3,151 
Generation Capacity 17.5 19.3 8.2 
Dominant Technologies Offshore Renewables Nuclear Power Renewable Energy 
West Midlands 
Income/capita: £14,012 
Unemployment: 8.9% 
Rural Population: 15.1% 
Investment, Electricity 981 994 2,154 
Investment, All Energy 2,198 2,038 2,472 
Generation Capacity 16.1 8.1 13.4 
Dominant Technologies Fossil Thermal CCS Fossil Thermal CCS Renewable Energy 
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Yorkshire & Humber 
Income/capita: £13,847 
Unemployment: 10.3% 
Rural Population: 17.5% 
Investment, Electricity 1,368 1,195 1,744 
Investment, All Energy 4,328 4,075 4,383 
Generation Capacity 13.3 10.0 10.2 
Dominant Technologies Fossil Thermal CCS Fossil Thermal CCS Renewable Energy 
Wales 
Income/capita: £13,740 
Unemployment: 9.3% 
Rural Population: 32.8% 
Investment, Electricity 1,578 1,591 1,481 
Investment, All Energy 1,456 1,898 1,870 
Generation Capacity 5.4 5.3 6.9 
Dominant Technologies Nuclear Power Nuclear Power Renewable Energy 
North East 
Income/capita: £13,587 
Unemployment: 11.6% 
Rural Population: 18.4% 
Investment, Electricity 683 1,403 1,175 
Investment, All Energy 1,431 1,912 1,676 
Generation Capacity 3.4 3.9 3.3 
Dominant Technologies Nuclear Power Nuclear Power Renewable Energy 
Northern Ireland 
Income/capita: £13,326 
Unemployment: 7.1% 
Rural Population: 35% 
Investment, Electricity 1,550 1,395 1,843 
Investment, All Energy 1,814 1,955 2,152 
Generation Capacity 3.1 2.9 3.4 
Dominant Technologies Renewable Energy Renewable Energy Renewable Energy 
 
1 Offshore regions have data allocated to onshore region where infrastructure makes landfall 
2,3,4  Gross Disposable Household Income, Rural Population [115] and Unemployment [116] data are 
based on 2011 Census information from the UK Office of National Statistics, The Scottish 
Government, and The Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NSRIA) 
 
Figure 9 and Figure 10 both use data from Table 2 to provide two graphical cross-
comparisons of the differences in cumulative regional investment costs into the 
electricity system in the period to 2050. Figure 9 allows an easier visualisation of the 
changes in total investment levels between scenarios while Figure 10 provides a clear 
view on the different geographical distribution patterns. From these two visualisations it 
can be seen that Market Rules and Central Coordination have regional patterns of 
investment that are broadly similar to one another, while Thousand Flowers is 
significantly different.  
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Figure 9 – Cumulative electricity system investment per capita to 2050, by region, line chart 
 
Figure 10 – Cumulative electricity system investment per capita to 2050, by region, gradient map 
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Figure 11 represents the underlying technological differences between the scenarios that 
cannot necessarily be observed from an analysis of investment levels. It can be seen that 
Market Rules and Central Co-ordination employ a similar balance of technologies overall. 
However, Market Rules relies on a greater proportion of offshore marine and wind 
resources which are abundant in the South West and Scotland, as well as more carbon 
capture and storage plants, particularly in the West Midlands and the East of England. 
Compared with Market Rules, the Central Co-ordination scenario invests a greater 
proportion of resources into developing nuclear power in England and Wales, which 
draws investment away from Scotland and the South West. Thousand Flowers, as might 
be expected, is radically different to both of the other cases with its focus on renewables 
and a more land-based deployment of technologies. Thousand Flowers sees English 
regions, particularly in the South of the country, dominating investment in new plant 
capacity, but also a shows a strong role for Scotland. 
 
Figure 11 – Regional electricity generation outlook for all scenarios, bar chart 
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Before embarking on a discussion of regional winners and losers, we finally consider 
energy infrastructure investments outside of the electricity sector. A strength of using a 
whole system model such as ESME is that all energy infrastructure, including electricity, 
heat, natural gas, bioenergy, hydrogen, and CO2 can be explored under the same 
analytical framework. While it is true that the electricity system is the most critical in the 
UK case for a transition to a low carbon future, and merits the level of detailed analysis 
we have illustrated here, it is important also not to ignore infrastructure requirements for 
these other energy vectors when exploring regional differences. Figure 12 illustrates a 
ranking of regional investment required in all energy infrastructure.  
 
Figure 12 – Cumulative energy infrastructure investments per capita by region, line chart 
 
Returning to the title of this paper, which regions appear to emerge as the potential 
winners and losers under these transitions? Assuming that economic development is a 
priority, that a clear link between infrastructure deployment and regional wealth 
creation can be made (see Section 4.5 for further discussion), and that negative impacts 
can be sufficiently mitigated in all cases, then we can draw some firm conclusions. 
London and the South East of England are the wealthiest regions of the UK (see Table 2) 
and have highly diversified economies, so the outcomes in terms of energy infrastructure 
are less crucial to their future economic development. However, Wales, the North East, 
and Northern Ireland all rank at the bottom of the pack in terms of UK income per capita, 
and the North East in particular has the highest levels of unemployment and the weakest 
regional economy in the country in terms of GVA/capita [117]. These three regions, 
together with the East Midlands, stand to lose out under all of the scenarios assessed in 
this paper, receiving per capita investment levels around five times lower than rival 
regions who benefit the most from the transition. 
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Who are the winners? The East of England consistently receives high levels of 
investment across all three scenarios, as do Yorkshire and Humber and the North West. 
While these latter two regions actually rank towards the bottom of the pack in terms of 
their electricity system investments (see Figure 9), their importance as coastal regions 
with access to carbon capture and sequestration infrastructure means that they become 
important centres for biofuel and hydrogen production in all scenarios. As can be seen 
from Table 2, Yorkshire and the North West both fall at the lower end of the UK wealth 
spectrum, and have been historically blighted by high unemployment. The outcomes 
modelled here under would represent an economic boon for these areas. The East of 
England, while not one of the UK’s poorest regions, has a large rural population and one 
that is highly agricultural in character. The results from the model analysis imply that this 
area could become an important region for energy industries of all types, diversifying its 
economic base. Scotland and the South West are also regions that see strong inward 
investment in energy infrastructure, with Scotland benefitting particularly strongly under 
Market Rules, and the South West under Thousand Flowers. These regions would benefit 
from economic diversification in the same way as the East of England. The South West is 
currently highly dependent on tourism while significant parts of Scotland rely on heavily 
on both tourism and the offshore oil and gas industry. 
 
4.3 Affordability, equity and public attitudes 
Energy affordability is a key concern for the public, and the total costs of any energy 
transition may be just as important as their regional impacts. Different actors are 
responsible for making the investments in each narrative, but regardless of how capital is 
allocated under each scenario, householders ultimately bear the costs in some form, 
whether through direct investment, taxation or utility payments. Figure 13 shows the 
modelled cumulative investments into the energy system to 2050 required for different 
definitions of the system boundary. These can be viewed as a proxy for the affordability 
of the transition in each case. Market Rules and Central Co-ordination show very similar 
investment levels for all system boundaries. Thousand Flowers requires the highest 
investments. This corroborates the findings from a previous assessment of transition 
costs for the three pathways [93]. 
A detailed breakdown of these investments will the subject of future publications, and an 
initial cross-comparison of sectoral transitions between Central Co-ordination and 
Thousand Flowers can be found in a recent publication by Li [98]. Briefly however, the 
modelled electricity system for Thousand Flowers has a higher carbon intensity than the 
other scenarios, due to its strong reliance on bioenergy, which ESME (unlike many 
ESOMs) treats as having a residual CO2 content i.e. the model considers energy used in 
the cultivation, processing, and transport of the fuel to power plants.  
As modelled therefore, the power sector mix under Thousand Flowers is very low carbon, 
but not zero carbon, unlike Central Co-ordination and Market Rules. The carbon content 
of future UK bioenergy resources is complex to estimate and is not explored further here, 
as it has been discussed at length in other work e.g. [118]. The higher residual emissions 
from the power sector in Thousand Flowers compared to the other scenarios, as well as 
the lower level of electrification in general (Section 2.3), means that in order to reach 
GHG reduction targets for 2050 the model must make proportionately higher 
investments in decarbonising other sectors, particularly transport.  
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Figure 13 – Cumulative investment to 2050 for each narrative under different system boundaries 
 
How the higher costs of transition in Thousand Flowers might affect the viability of this 
scenario in the eyes of consumers is difficult to directly infer. A recent global meta-
analysis of 30 willingness-to-pay studies with 137 estimates suggests that consumers are 
actually willing to pay more for renewable electricity, but that the exact premium varies 
between national contexts [119]. German customers for example, may be willing to pay a 
premium (as high as 16%) for renewable electricity from community energy groups 
[120,121]. Studies commissioned by the UK’s statutory consumer protection body 
suggest that while there is a degree of correlation between income and willingness to 
pay for environmental protection, consumers are broadly willing to pay more towards 
the costs of an energy transition as long as government and corporations are seen to be 
also contributing fairly [122].  
As well as affordability issues, the public acceptability of different energy technologies 
and the direct impacts on communities may also play a large part in any future energy 
transition. Investments in energy infrastructure, like power stations, are often politicised 
at a local level. UK research has yet to draw any firm conclusions about community 
attitudes towards different technologies, which are likely to be heterogeneous and 
subject to change through time. Clearly, there are also complex nuances to attitudes that 
go beyond a binary support/reject characterisation. For example, recent UK research into 
the public acceptability of different energy technologies has shown strong support for 
wind and solar energy [123] in principle, but this has not prevented significant objections 
to onshore wind farms being placed near communities [124].  
 
4.4 Implications for policy 
At the time of writing, there is a spectrum of policy autonomy between UK regions 
regarding energy policy, with Northern Ireland having effective full control, Wales having 
the least formal powers, and Scotland being somewhere in-between [125]. The 
presented analysis shows that Scotland will benefit under all scenarios but also stands to 
gain or lose significantly depending on the choice of transition pathway (Section 4.2). In 
Scotland, the central UK government currently retains fiscal and legislative powers 
pertaining to energy generation, transmission and distribution, but the devolved 
Scottish administration has control over environmental regulation and planning as well 
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as specific powers to approve or block power stations above certain sizes [126,127]. As 
noted in Section 1.4, Scotland also has a set of climate and energy targets that are 
separate from those of the rest of the UK and has imposed a moratorium on new nuclear 
power stations on its territory. The Scottish government is also very open about its 
intention to seek a UK-wide regulatory regime that will promote the use of its abundant 
renewable energy resources [128].  
All three scenarios show Scotland having very high investment in the electricity system 
relative to the population. A high degree of policy coordination between the Scottish 
government and the UK Parliament may therefore be required in future. A prominent 
role for Scotland in national energy policy would also need to be politically acceptable for 
the rest of the UK. At present, intergovernmental relations between Scotland and the 
UK Parliament are essentially ad hoc, with no explicit mechanisms to ensure long-term 
policy coordination [56]. Both the Central Coordination and Market Rules scenarios 
imply that the UK government successfully secures buy-in from communities in England 
and Wales for the construction of large numbers of new and possibly unpopular nuclear 
power stations, while Scotland remains nuclear-free. Nuclear power has historically been 
deeply divisive in the UK, but studies suggests that the public may reluctantly support 
nuclear power if the government successfully frames other options as having been 
exhausted [129,130]. 
The Thousand Flowers narrative implies a largely nuclear-free future, but would require a 
strong shift in attitudes towards the community ownership of generation, along the lines 
of the German model, where almost 50% of renewable energy assets are in community 
hands [131]. Public support would be particularly critical in light of the significantly 
higher transition costs implied by this pathway (Figure 13). Government would need to 
signal strong support for such a transition in order to incentivise citizen and investor 
participation for the financing of community energy projects. Policies to reduce or 
eliminate information asymmetry between community-owned and corporate utilities 
regarding planning and permitting for new schemes, widening the remit of existing feed-
in-tariff schemes to cover larger installations [132], and a relaxation of licencing 
conditions for locally owned generation [133] are all examples of mechanisms that the 
government might take in this case. 
 
4.5 Developing future insights 
There are many possible directions for extending the analysis of energy transition 
impacts at the regional level based on the work presented in this paper. While 
investment distribution was assessed for all energy infrastructure (Figure 12), technology 
siting was only mapped for the power sector (Section 3.0). One obvious extension of this 
work would be to perform spatial mapping of technology deployment for gas, bioenergy, 
hydrogen and CO2. Another would be to expand the scope of the analysis further to 
explore regional economic restructuring and employment effects. ESME does not 
endogenously represent macro-economic feedbacks between the energy system and 
different economic sectors, so the impacts on factors such as production, consumption 
and consumer welfare, for example, cannot be directly observed in the model outputs 
presented so far. This in turn, makes discussion of strategies for promoting regional 
economic development, wealth redistribution, and the politics of addressing inequalities 
between competing regions particularly difficult without further modelling and analysis. 
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The employment effects of energy system transformation are one area that is 
acknowledged as being complex to model [134,135]. One challenge is that over long time 
periods, economic factors such as labour and capital assets can be relocated to where 
they are needed, and workers can also travel across regional boundaries to seek 
employment. Long term trends in population demographics, such as age structure and 
migration between regions would need to be taken into account. Another complexity is 
that factories producing components for the energy transition do not necessarily need to 
be located in the regions where they will eventually be installed, provided that transport 
links are sufficiently strong. Understanding how each of the energy transition scenarios 
might drive regional changes in economic activity and employment would require ESME 
outputs to be coupled to a full regional macroeconomic model as well as detailed data on 
industrial supply chains. The negative impacts of constructing energy system 
infrastructure on industries like tourism would also need to be fully understood and 
integrated into this future work.  
 
5.0 Conclusions 
This paper demonstrates the latest step in a long running process of UK science-policy 
engagement. Detailed narratives about the future of the UK energy system and 
specifically, the electricity sector, built up over several years in consultation with UK 
government, industry, and civil society stakeholders were reflected in a leading whole 
economy energy systems model with explicit representation of sub-national regions. 
This provided a test environment to explore the feasibility of the scenario narratives as 
well as allowing the interactions between the stakeholder visions for the power system 
and other economic sectors to be explored using the rich technological detail of the 
model. The sub-national regional characterisation of the model was used to explore how 
the geographical distribution of technologies and their costs might be distributed under 
each scenario, with the results discussed in the context of the complex regional political 
geography of the UK.  
From a technical feasibility perspective, a key finding is that the Realising Transition 
Pathways scenarios rely on levels of bioenergy that are at the high end of published 
estimates. The scenarios require an assumption that significant volumes of bioenergy 
will be imported to the UK in future in order for them to be compatible with achieving 
the UK’s national climate policy targets for 2050. The use of bioenergy with carbon 
capture and storage features strongly in the model solutions, often outside of the power 
sector for end-use fuel production. 
The geographical analysis presented here demonstrates the type of insights into regional 
technology deployment and costs at a sub-national level which are difficult to achieve 
with nationally aggregated models. The main strategic insight for governments and 
communities that arises from this analysis is that the sub-national distribution of energy 
transition costs can vary significantly depending on the choice of decarbonisation 
pathway taken. Future technology choices in the power sector bring with them strong 
regional implications for future investment targeting, suggesting the possibility of there 
being regional winners and losers under different transitions.  
Under a broad range of technological scenarios, the East of England, the North West, 
Yorkshire and Humber, Scotland, and the South West all emerge as “winners”. These 
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regions receive large per-capita investments that have the potential to both drive wealth 
creation in historically disadvantaged areas as well as diversify economic activity. The 
East Midlands, the North East of England, Wales and Northern Ireland all emerge as 
“losers” from the energy transitions modelled here. While in absolute terms there are 
large investments in all of these areas, they receive much less in per capita investment 
terms than other regions of the country. The North East stands out in particular as an 
area with the UK’s highest levels of unemployment and the second lowest per capita 
income. The question of whether the energy transition can be used as a vehicle to 
promote regional economic development in disadvantaged areas remains highly topical, 
but requires further analysis with regional macroeconomic modelling and supply chain 
assessment. Future work will assess the scope for regional economic policies that 
develop supply chains to meet the needs of future energy transitions while increasing 
opportunities for inward investment in marginal areas. 
The mapping of economic costs to individual regional actors (e.g. specific power 
companies) is difficult to identify conclusively from this analysis, but clearly it is possible 
that actions which maximise local investment in a given region (e.g. the North East) 
might have the simultaneous effect of raising overall costs across the whole system. This 
begins to illustrate some of the complexities surrounding the delivery of an equitable 
energy transition, where local action to benefit one community may simultaneously 
disadvantage other communities or actually present affordability challenges for all.  
In terms of overall affordability, the two pathways involving the most electrification and 
the most large-scale centralised generation plant, Central Co-ordination and Market 
Rules, were found to require the lowest investment costs in the period to 2050, while the 
distributed energy pathway, Thousand Flowers, involved the highest costs. The choice of 
decarbonisation strategy for the power sector in Thousand Flowers is found to have 
knock-on effects that require additional investments in the transport sector, an insight 
which can only be shown through integrated analysis using a whole system model. 
From a policy perspective, the study results point to co-ordination between different 
governments, particularly between the central UK Government in London and the 
Scottish Government in Edinburgh, as being important to influencing the character of 
the transition to a low carbon energy system. Across the assessed scenarios, Scotland 
emerges as a renewable energy powerhouse requiring high levels of per-capita 
investment in the energy system, and also escapes a requirement to host nuclear power 
stations on its territory. It remains to be seen whether politicians can address the 
perceptions of inequality that this might raise amongst the electorate, particularly as it 
appears that English regions could lose out more from increased investment in Scotland 
than Wales or Northern Ireland. 
Another important issue raised by the analysis is whether the future interests of the 
different devolved administrations will push in the same direction, be synergistic with 
one another, and be consistent with a whole-economy, whole-UK emissions reduction 
target. At the time of writing, there are no official policy statements on how these 
differing regions can collaborate together in the mid-term to achieve the UK’s long term 
targets. The distributional impacts of energy transition policies, which parts of society 
pay and which parts benefit, and what the contribution from individual sub-national 
regions should be remains a significant unaddressed question in policy terms. What is 
clear however, is that, without convincingly articulating the sub-national costs, benefits, 
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and governance requirements for different energy transition pathways, it is difficult to 
see how a co-ordinated national-scale decarbonisation plan can be delivered in an 
affordable and timely fashion, if at all. 
Finally, this work demonstrates an effort by energy system modellers to contribute to a 
wider process of interdisciplinary research, bringing the strengths of quantitative energy 
economic analysis to a long-running and successful process of socio-technical 
exploration, expert engagement, and ongoing policy impact. In particular, it shows how 
taking a formal systems approach can enhance the outputs from other disciplines by: 
allowing assumptions from different groups to be formalised and shared in a common 
framework, enabling scenarios to be tested against objectives in a rigorous fashion, and 
helping researchers with different interests and specialisms to look beyond narrow 
sectoral boundaries (e.g. power, transport) at cross cutting issues and the wider context 
for their work. 
Interdisciplinary research undoubtedly faces many challenges. It can messy, complex to 
articulate and difficult to execute in practice. From a modelling perspective, it may 
challenge positivist notions of solution optimality, mathematical elegance, and 
disciplinary segregation. However, the authors urge pragmatism in this regard and for 
the innovative use of energy economy models to advance the state of policy discourse on 
energy system transitions in collaboration with colleagues from other disciplines. The 
urgency of the climate policy challenge leaves no other alternative.  
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8.0 Appendix A. Supplementary data 
 
8.1 Realising Transition Pathways Scenario Descriptions 
The descriptions included below are based in whole or in part, on those published 
previously by Foxon [83] and the RTP Engine Room [133]. 
  
8.1.1 Market Rules 
All state-owned energy suppliers were privatised in the UK during the 1990s as part of a 
policy of energy market liberalisation [136]. The current paradigm is that there is full 
competition of retail power and gas supply overseen by a state energy regulator, the 
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem).The Market Rules scenario envisages that 
the governance of the UK energy system will continue to be dominated by a market-led 
logic. Under the Market Rules scenario, the so-called “Big Six” UK energy companies [86] 
remain the dominant decision makers influencing the electricity system with the role of 
government being limited to establishing the market framework for their operation.  
Under this scenario, the UK government perceives that large corporate utilities are the 
only market players that can finance and deploy the necessary investments required to 
transform the energy system. The government therefore establishes a policy framework 
that involves both a cap-and-trade scheme for GHG emissions as well as incentives for 
the deployment of low carbon technologies. The UK government sets a stringent cap on 
domestic GHG emissions in coordination with European partners, resulting in a high 
carbon price under the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). This strong price 
signal is complimented by government support for technology demonstration and the 
commercialisation of large-scale renewable power and carbon capture and storage 
projects.  
The large corporate utilities that dominate the market focus their investment on 
technologies which they already have the in-house expertise to deploy and operate, or 
for which they see the largest future returns on investment, namely nuclear power, 
offshore wind, and fossil-thermal combustion plant with carbon capture and storage. 
The resulting investments in new capacity leads to the carbon intensity of electricity 
supply being radically reduced during the 2020s. There is widespread electrification of 
heating and transport as well as some industrial processes from the 2030s onwards, 
leading to a 50% overall increase in electricity demand over the period 2010-2050. From 
a consumer perspective, the scenario envisages households bearing the costs of the 
transition while utilities profit. Concerns around security of supply and climate change 
  
43 
impacts results in passive acceptance of higher costs, while lifestyle changes are limited 
to the purchase of increasingly efficient electrical appliances. 
 
8.1.2 Central Co-ordination 
The Central Co-ordination scenario envisages that the government will take a leading 
role in the transformation of the energy system. The UK government’s current position 
on energy policy is to pursue three competing objectives, namely minimising costs for 
consumers, ensuring security of supply and pursing “ambitious action” on climate 
change [137]. These are sometimes referred to as the “trilemma” owing to the challenge 
of simultaneously prioritising each of these three objectives [8].  
In the Central Co-ordination scenario, the UK government concludes that meeting these 
three goals in an effective fashion requires a more direct and interventionist role in the 
governance of the energy system than is currently practiced. Towards the end of the 
2010s the government establishes a Strategic Energy Agency with a broad remit to 
design the future energy system from a top-down perspective. The Strategic Energy 
Agency develops “technology push” programmes that are tied to a wider industrial 
strategy, focusing on fields where the UK has the potential to develop global leadership 
and create a market for exports. These are carbon capture and storage, marine energy, 
and electric drivetrain vehicles.  
The government also issues direct tenders for generation procurement and supply 
contracts to large integrated energy companies, who bid competitively. Government 
perceives that the energy transition can occur with minimal disruption to established 
business models by focusing (as in Market Rules) on the delivery of large-scale low 
carbon generation technologies such as nuclear power, offshore wind, and fossil thermal 
generation with CCS. Large energy companies see that the delivery of these low carbon 
technologies is de-risked significantly by having the assets partially underwritten by the 
UK government. Increased electrification for industrial processes, building heat supply 
and transport occurs in the 2030s and 2040s, but the government provides strong 
incentives for household energy efficiency measures which successfully limits the overall 
increase in electricity demand to 20% between 2010 and 2050. 
 
8.1.3 Thousand Flowers 
Social movements to address climate change and community ownership of energy 
generation are relatively niche activities in the UK [138]. The Thousand Flowers scenario 
was developed to explore how the energy system may develop if this were to change. 
Under the Thousand Flowers case, economic development strategies by local 
governments begin to incorporate community ownership of energy assets in the late 
2010s, taking inspiration from social movements in countries such as Germany and 
Denmark. Early projects are highly successful. Local value capture and employment 
creation in the supply chain lead to a virtuous cycle of reinvestment, with the result that 
policies incentivising community energy spread to many parts of the country. Central 
government seizes the opportunity to access privately held capital for financing the 
energy transition and establishes incentives for small-scale renewable generation (e.g. 
feed-in tariffs) as well as modifying the role of the regulator, Ofgem. The new regulator, 
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envisaged as “Ofgem+” both continues its’ existing role in regulating assets that are 
connected at the transmission level but also expands its mandate to include enabling and 
regulating energy provision at the local level. 
New market entrants take business over time away from the “Big Six” UK energy 
companies. Partnerships between Energy Service Companies (ESCOs), communities and 
local governments, as well as the direct municipal ownership of energy assets becomes 
increasingly widespread. Overall, civil society participation in electricity supply expands 
from 1% in 2010 to 50% by 2050. Smaller scale technologies see significant uptake 
during the 2020s, with micro-scale combined heat and power (CHP) and district-scale 
CHP fuelled by bioenergy comprising a significant fraction of new capacity additions, as 
well as locally sited wind and solar photovoltaics. Large utility companies, faced with this 
loss of market share, either seek to enter the ESCO market themselves or double-down 
on their core business and concentrate on providing balancing services with large-scale 
plant. Very little new nuclear power is deployed under the Thousand Flowers scenario, 
reflecting the historical anti-nuclear sentiment of much of the European pro-
environmental movement. Large-scale generation provision focuses on wind power and 
fossil thermal plant with CCS. 
Strong improvements in energy efficiency are achieved through the retrofitting of the 
existing building stock and maintaining ambitious national standards for new building 
performance. From a social perspective, pro-environmental attitudes and behaviours are 
also envisaged as becoming more mainstream, leading to further energy savings. The 
provision of a significant fraction of building heating from bioenergy CHP in this scenario 
means that the electrification of heat supply is less pronounced than in Market Rules or 
Central Co-ordination. Overall, electricity demand increases by 10% over the period 
2010-2050 despite significantly increased electrification of heating, transport, and 
industrial processes.  
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8.2 Breakdown of Sector Inputs 
 
8.2.1 Power sector  
The electricity generation portfolios for each storyline were heavily constrained by 
imposing minimum and maximum build constraints for different power technologies in 
ESME. This was in order to match the latest assumptions used by the Realising 
Transition Pathways project consortium, which are similar to those employed in previous 
work [91–93] and are illustrated in Figure 14. With the total installed capacity for each 
power sector technology fixed normatively at the national level, the model was left to 
then endogenously determine the sub-national spatial allocation of these assets. 
Figure 14 – Comparison of 2050 Power Generation Capacity Portfolios 
 
Spatial deployment of technologies in ESME is driven by regional energy service 
demands, the regional availability of different energy resources (wind, solar energy etc.), 
and the trade-offs found by the model between deploying supply capacity locally in a 
given region and building infrastructure to connect to resources in neighbouring regions. 
New large scale power stations were restricted in the London region for all 3 narratives to 
reflect future land-use constraints, and new nuclear power is deterministically allocated 
to the South West of the country under the Thousand Flowers pathway as this is a core 
element of that narrative. The Scottish government has imposed a moratorium on 
nuclear power, so for the purposes of this analysis residual nuclear power capacity in 
Scotland is decommissioned at the end of its technical lifetimes and no new capacity is 
built as a replacement.  
 
8.2.2 Buildings sector 
ESME defines multiple classes of building, disaggregated by four levels of initial thermal 
performance, two levels of energy-efficient retrofit, and three levels of urban density, 
with performance also varying for each of these classes under the 12 geographical 
regions in the model. The regional identifier is used to differentiate otherwise identical 
buildings by the climatic conditions in which they are built, as well as to project how 
demand may vary in future under changing temperatures. Different constraints were 
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used to reflect storyline differences in the thermal performance of buildings and the level 
of success in retrofitting the existing housing stock, with Thousand Flowers being the 
most ambitious, Market Rules being the least, and Central Coordination being at an 
intermediate level. End-use electrical appliance demand for each scenario was also 
varied in-line with the narratives and followed the approach taken in previous work by 
Barton et al. [92].  
 
Table 3 – Buildings Sector Inputs 
Transition 
Narrative 
Electrical Appliance 
Demand 
Building Thermal 
Performance  
Building Stock Max Retrofit 
Rate 
Market Rules 
Demand intensity 
increase of 20% by 2050 
Moderate level of 
retrofits only 
0.5m properties / year from 2020 
(enough to address ~57% of 
existing stock by 2050) 
Central  
Co-ordination 
Demand intensity 
decrease of 10% by 2050 
Moderate level of 
retrofits only 
1m properties / year from 2020 
(enough to address all existing 
dwellings by 2050) 
Thousand 
Flowers 
Demand intensity 
decrease of 30% by 2050 
Moderate and 
deep levels of 
retrofit available 
1m properties / year from 2020 
(enough to address all existing 
dwellings by 2050) 
 
 
8.2.3 Industrial sector 
Previous quantification of the Market Rules storyline by Barton et al. [92] involved 
industrial output broadly maintaining existing levels, while the storylines for Central 
Coordination and Thousand Flowers were modelled with large reductions in UK 
industrial output (40%), with the assumption that imported manufactured goods make 
up any difference in consumer demand. Input assumptions to ESME were aligned with 
the previous work. The representation of the industrial sector in ESME is highly 
disaggregated between different industries. A 40% overall drop in industrial output was 
achieved through higher reductions in heavy emitting sectors like steel manufacturing, 
chemical processing etc. while food and agricultural production were not modified. 
While changes in total industrial output is therefore aligned with the narratives, the 
actual allocation of primary energy resources to meet industrial demand is left for the 
ESME model to determine endogenously. This means that for example, if required to hit 
carbon targets, industrial fuel switching can occur and have the associated costs 
captured. Technological change in the industrial sector, particularly fuel switching, has 
emerged as an important option in recent analysis for the UK government [139]. 
 
8.2.4 Transport sector 
The narrative storylines for all three pathways see large increases in the uptake of 
alternative fuel vehicles, particularly electric vehicles. However, transport demand is one 
area identified in previous modelling work (see Section 2.2) where authors have noted 
that additional mitigation measures (such as using hydrogen produced from CCS) may 
be required. As a result, technology deployment in the transport sector is left for the 
ESME model to determine endogenously within the boundaries of the other constraints 
that define the energy system and the modelled policy targets. 
